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Democracy for the Future: A Conceptual 
Framework to Assess Institutional Reform* 
Abstract: There seem to be good reasons that democratic institutions must be 
reformed in order to minimize the danger of unsustainable policy decisions 
infringing upon duties of intergenerational justice. This is why there exist a 
number of different proposals of how to reform democratic states in order to 
foster their duties towards the future. However, the debate lacks a systematic 
assessment of these suggested reforms within a coherent theoretical and norma-
tive framework. This paper aims at developing such a framework. 
We suggest two conceptual dimensions defining the spectrum of different justi-
fiable institutional reforms: the relation between democracy and justice as one 
dimension and the conditions considered relevant for viewing democracies as 
responsible collective agents as the other. Depending on how we understand 
this relation and these conditions, it is possible to substantiate a set of types of 
institutional reforms that will promote democracies’ capacities to comply with 
their responsibilities towards the future. 
Keywords: Democracy, Intergenerational Justice, Institutional Reform, 
Collective Responsibility, Sustainability, Climate Change 
Skepticism about democracy has existed since antiquity and, in light of the 
recent environmental crises, has increased since the 1970s. Some claim that in a 
democracy there is a danger of not bringing about the necessary policy deci-
sions towards its sustainable transformation. Similar to Plato, the so-called 
Survivalists claim that it is not the people, but a prudent intellectual elite of the 
state who should make policy decisions about sustainability issues.1 Likewise, 
in the face of unsatisfactory climate negotiations, it has been argued that demo-
cratic decision-making must take a backseat in favor of effective climate poli-
tics.2 But even if it does not come to the claim that a prudent intellectual elite 
should rule states, there seem to be good reasons that democratic institutions 
must be reformed in order to minimize the danger of unsustainable policy deci-
sions. There is at least no clear evidence that democratic countries have sub-
 
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1 Hardin 1968; Heilbroner 1980; Ophuls 1992; Jonas 2003. 
2 Kitcher 2010; Shearman, Smith, Joseph Wyne 2007; Vanderheiden 2009. 
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stantially better policies implemented than non-democratic countries regarding 
CO2-emissions or greening the economy.3 Against this backdrop, scholarly re-
search in political theory as well as in political philosophy produced a number 
of different proposals of how to reform institutions of democratic states in order 
to foster their duties towards the future. However, the debate lacks a systematic 
assessment of these suggested reforms within a coherent theoretical framework. 
Our paper wants to pave the way for a remedy by developing a first approach to 
a systematic conceptual framework that will allow assessing institutional re-
forms. 
We first argue for institutional reforms as the best available strategy (1). We 
then suggest going at least along two conceptual dimensions4 defining the spec-
trum of different justifiable institutional reforms. On the one hand, such reforms 
depend on how the relation between democracy and justice is understood (2). 
On the other hand, the institutional reforms indicated depend on the conditions 
considered relevant for viewing democracies as responsible collective agents 
(3). Our framework assumes that depending on the answers to both these di-
mensions, it is possible to substantiate a set of types of institutional reforms in 
order for democracies to be able to better comply with their responsibilities 
towards the future (4). 
 Motivating the Framework 
Generally speaking, there are three critical lines within the literature question-
ing the fitness of current democracies to cope with the prevailing global envi-
ronmental and climate challenges. First, skepticism about democracy in general 
calls for priority of elite-decisions especially on the international level. Second, 
skepticism about the currently existing state-based democracies calls for some-
thing like a global democracy. While both these first two options limit state 
sovereignty in order to globally promote more sustainable policy decisions a 
third critical line does not. This third line of criticism concerns the current insti-
tutional settings in democracies, calling for institutional reforms.5 Without en-
tering the minefields of pro and cons for options one and two given the limited 
 
3 The US, Canada and Australia are prominent cases. Cf. section 3 for further reasons. 
4 We do not claim to offer an all-encompassing framework already, only a starting point for it. 
5 Lafferty 2004. 
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space of this paper, we will present our rationale for favoring line three in the 
following. 
The following three basic claims substantiate the presumptions of our pa-
per, namely its focus on single states as the relevant collective agents and the 
need for reforming democracies: First, in order to tackle the global and inter-
generational challenges faced today, measures must be taken as promptly as 
possible. These measures, therefore, must happen within the already existing 
global governance structure; that is, within the framework of a global structure 
with individual sovereign states and weakly defined or even non-existent global 
institutions. In international negotiations, e.g. on climate change, global envi-
ronmental problems, poverty alleviation and crisis management, states are 
viewed as the primary agents who must take on responsibility. According to the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, states are seen as the 
responsible collective agents who should contribute to the prevention or mitiga-
tion of damages and losses in proportion to their contribution to the problem 
and their economic and technical capacities.6 
Second, given the first claim, stable and functioning states are necessary for 
the most prompt and efficient implementation of the policy decisions required 
to tackle the global and intergenerational challenges of environmental and 
climate damages and losses. For coordinated state action, there must be institu-
tions available that can relieve individuals from epistemically excessive de-
mands and that can steer the necessary measures into collectively acceptable 
directions.7 These two elements may be viewed as an argument from feasibility 
to principles.  
Third, environmental concerns have become intrinsically related to con-
cerns of intra- and intergenerational justice since the dawn of the sustainability 
debate. As there are well-known arguments linking justice-considerations with 
democracy-considerations, there are good reasons to follow the democracy and 
not the elitist line. For this reason, it makes sense to initially evaluate the exist-
ing democratic institutions centered on the state, as well as to make suggestions 
for reform if need be.8 We argue that the onus probandi is on the side of those 
who want, in the face of global and intergenerational challenges, to limit the 
right to democratic sovereignty to global institutions.9  
 
6 United Nations 1992A, 1992B, 1998, 2015. 
7 Höffe 2009; Leist 2012; Miller 2011; Roser, Seidel 2013. 
8 Caney 2005; Thompson 1999. 
9 Beckman 2008; Cheneval 2011; Miller 2008. 
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Our suggested framework for assessing the needed reform of democratic in-
stitutions contains two conceptual dimensions: (I) Duties of democracies to-
wards the future are to be explicated by a theory of intergenerational justice, 
which can be derived by clarifying how the relation between democracy and 
justice is to be understood.10 (II) If democracies as collective agents can be seen 
as responsible for the future, then it must be clear under which institutional 
conditions democracies can be considered to be responsible collective agents.11 
Although these two conceptual dimensions might appear to be distinct, 
they heavily depend on each other if we want to know whether and under which 
conditions democracies can be deemed collective agents responsible towards 
the future. The first dimension defines the intergenerational duties of justice for 
democracies. However, this is not sufficient to determine the necessary condi-
tions for democracies to be able to serve as relevant collective agents taking on 
responsibility for the future. Duties of justice can only state which burdens de-
mocracies should carry for the benefit of the future, but they do not define the 
institutional conditions under which democracies count as the relevant subjects 
of responsibility. Inversely, it appears to be obvious that the institutional condi-
tions under which democracies can count as collective agents responsible to-
wards the future should also advance democracies’ duties of intergenerational 
justice. Assessing whether this is the case necessitates being clear about democ-
racies’ duties towards the future first. Hence, it appears that the two dimensions 
of (I) duties towards the future and (II) institutional conditions for responsibility 
heavily depend on each other. However, these two dimensions only span a vec-
tor space for legitimate institutional reforms given requirements for intergenera-
tional justice. We do not include empirical claims on the efficiency and efficacy 
of the reform in question. 
As we show in the following, both dimensions compose a framework to as-
sess institutional reform in order for democracies to be better able to conform to 
their duties towards the future. The framework allows critically analyzing and 
categorizing the institutional reforms suggested in the literature in order for 
democracies to be able to better comply with their responsibilities towards the 
future. We suppose that institutional reforms are only justifiable if they chal-
lenge neither the relation between democracy and justice, nor the conditions 
necessary for democracies to be responsible collective agents. Consequently, 
the goal of our framework is to provide the basis for substantiating a set of insti-
tutional reforms justifiable against the backdrop of the framework established 
 
10 Beckman 2012; Beckman, Page 2008; Buchanan 2002; Valentini 2012. 
11 Miller 2007, 2004; Meyer, Sanklecha 2014. 
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by our two conceptual dimensions. Before being able to show how our frame-
work functions, we elaborate on the two conceptual dimensions of our frame-
work in the next two sections in turn. 
 Democracy and Intergenerational Justice 
Although environmental justice in all its facets is at the center of “Green Politi-
cal Theory”, the debate rarely addresses the following question: Which inter-
generational duties do democracies have?12 This is not surprising, considering 
that the same is true for the more general question of how democracy and jus-
tice are related. However, in order to know how well democracies can and do 
perform regarding their responsibilities towards the future, it is necessary to be 
clear about what intergenerational duties of justice democracies do have. For 
our framework we assume that the relation between democracy and justice 
determines the duties of intergenerational justice of democracies. Therefore, the 
first conceptual dimension of our framework clarifies which intergenerational 
duties democracies have to live up to. 
Scholarly research on the subject provides two perspectives on the relation 
between democracy and justice13: i) The implementation of a just social struc-
ture14 takes precedence over democracy;15 according to this view, democracy 
only serves the implementation and concretization of demands of justice. ii) 
Justice is constitutive for the possibility of democracy;16 for without the guaran-
tee of minimal conditions of procedural and substantial justice, collective deci-
sion-making between free and equal citizens is not possible. We have a closer 
 
12 Important exceptions include Eckersley 2004; Goodin 1992. 
13 We abstract in the following from a number of internal differences regarding justice, e.g. 
what principle of justice (see, e.g., Barry 1991 and the contributions in Gosseries and Meyer 
2009, part I) or what metric of justice (see, e.g., the contributions in Nussbaum and Sen 1993) is 
being presupposed. We also refrain from taking the ideal/non-ideal distinction into account 
(see, e.g, Swift 2008). Regarding our discussion of intergenerational justice in this paper, we 
assume that it is not undermined by assumptions provoking non-identity issues (see Meyer 
2065, sects 3 and 4). 
14 By “just social structure” we mean to refer to a Rawlsian understanding of the importance 
of a set of institutions for realizing what social justice requires. For a critical discussion see 
Meyer 2015. 
15 Arneson 2003, 2004; Harris 2010; Van Parijs 1996, 2011. 
16 Christiano 2004, 2010; Gould 1990, 2004, 2013; Pettit 1997, 2012. 
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look at both these perspectives and the intergenerational duties of democracies 
they establish in what follows. 
i) If democracy is only of importance for the implementation and concreti-
zation of a just social structure, then democratically legitimate policy decisions 
must also be conducive to this purpose. Hence, with regard to justice, it must 
not only be possible to question but also to abolish legitimate democratic policy 
decisions that run contrary to this goal. Such a view makes two assumptions: 
First, that there is something such as an objectively correct or most just societal 
order that can only be guaranteed through the institutions of the state. Second, 
citizens have good reasons to follow the state’s regulations insofar as a just 
social structure better allows them to pursue their goals successfully.17 Accord-
ingly, many proponents of this view believe that democratic participation is 
only warranted if such participation contributes to the implementation and 
concretization of the just social structure.18  
ii) In contrast, if minimal conditions of justice are constitutive for the possi-
bility of democracy, then the majority of decisions resulting from democratic 
decision-making should be respected as legitimate for that reason, regardless of 
how just they are in terms of a more demanding or different understanding of 
justice.19 Within the scope of such a relation between democracy and justice, 
claims of justice play a role either as political positions among others only, or as 
putting forward a necessary requirement for the assurance of fair opportunities 
for participation in political decision-making. Proponents of this view are often 
of the opinion that certain minimal procedural and substantial conditions of 
justice are needed for the assurance of equal participation for all citizens. As a 
result, the range of legitimate policy decisions is often understood as being 
limited by these minimal conditions of justice because they are constitutive for 
the possibility of democracy.20 
Depending on the relation between democracy and justice, other duties of 
intergenerational justice vis-à-vis democracy are warranted. i) If justice takes 
precedence over democracy, then democratic decisions can only be legitimate 
provided they do not undermine the project of establishing or maintaining a just 
social structure. ii) If minimal conditions of justice are constitutive for the pos-
sibility of democracy, then demands of intergenerational justice can be under-
stood to be restricted to those claims which do not threaten to undermine these 
 
17 Raz 1986, 2006. 
18 E.g. van Parijs 2011. 
19 Christiano 2004; Horton 2012; Pettit 2012. 
20 Christiano 2010. 
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constitutive conditions. Therefore, the duties of intergenerational justice of 
democracies can be located on a line between two poles making up the first 
conceptual dimension of our framework. In accordance with the first pole, de-
mocracy’s duties of intergenerational justice consist in maintaining or bringing 
about the conditions of a just social structure. In accordance with the second 
pole, a democracy’s duties of intergenerational justice are limited to those that 
help to preserve the conditions of justice constitutive for the possibility of de-
mocracy.  
i) In terms of the first pole, democracy’s intergenerational duties consist in 
establishing or maintaining the just social structure for the future. Deviating 
from a strict claim of precedence of intergenerational justice so understood in 
favor of democratic influence is, however, justified for a number of reasons: a) 
Predictions about future environmental and climate damages are afflicted with 
uncertainty. This often contributes to people reasonably disagreeing about what 
policies should be pursued. b) In all likelihood, measures addressing the de-
mands of future generations limit the quality of life for at least some people 
living today. Therefore, in order to increase the legitimacy of decisions, all those 
affected should be included in the decision-making process about the measures 
to be taken.21 c) In many instances, there is reasonable disagreement about how 
to distribute the burdens of policies to be pursued or of the damages ex-
pected. In these cases, it seems minimally fair to involve all those potentially 
facing burdens in the decision-making.22  
ii) According to the second pole, democracies are obligated to maintain the 
constitutive conditions of justice for the possibility of democracy. However, 
there are several reasons to deviate from these rather minimal demands: a) 
From the perspective of an egalitarian understanding of intergenerational jus-
tice, future generations should live under qualitatively similar conditions of 
justice as citizens of democracies living today and not just under minimally 
necessary conditions. b) Not only are central political institutions relevant for 
the survival of a particular political entity, but also, for instance, certain basic 
cultural conditions or the preservation of a determined landscape. The protec-
tion of both of these is not necessarily ensured by the preservation of the mini-
mal conditions of justice necessary for the possibility of democracy.23 c) Citizens 
justifiably develop projects that reach far into the future. The possibility of such 
 
21 Goodin 2007; Schuppert, Wallimann-Helmer 2014. 
22 Krütli u.a. 2015; Meyer, Sanklecha 2014. 
23 Meyer, Roser 2012. 
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long-lasting projects being realized cannot be secured by minimal standards of 
justice constitutive for the possibility of democracy.24  
Besides reasons to deviate from both poles of the relation between intergen-
erational justice and democracy, both understandings have their problems. i) If 
justice has unqualified precedence over democracy, then experts of justice 
should judge what policy decisions contribute best to the maintenance or estab-
lishment of a just social structure.25 Such a perspective seems to align with the 
assessments of the Platonists and the Survivalists and appears to be problemat-
ic because it is hardly compatible with the right of all citizens to equal political 
participation. ii) If, however, minimal conditions of justice are constitutive for 
the possibility of democracy, then legitimate policy decisions could entail in-
fringements on duties of justice, including intergenerational duties. According 
to this view, the conditions of justice that are constitutive for the possibility of 
democracy are only those that enable equal political participation of all citizens. 
In consequence, many policy decisions must satisfy demands of legitimacy but 
only minimal standards of justice.26  
Is one of these two perspectives superior to the other? What is clear is that 
the standards of intergenerational justice to be satisfied by democratic policy 
decisions are likely to be more demanding if we understand democracy as a 
mere instrument for the implementation and concretization of a just social 
structure. What speaks in favor of social justice having unqualified precedence 
over democracy is that such precedence could minimize the danger that the 
demands of future generations are violated due to inadequate policy decisions. 
However, the spectrum of legitimate policy decisions in democracies could be 
too restricted by such a claim of precedence. If, on the other hand, the condi-
tions of justice that are constitutive for democracy define the intergenerational 
duties of democracies, then there is the risk of violating the rights of future gen-
erations that cannot clearly be shown to be constitutive for the possibility of 
democracy.  
We expect that normative and conceptual research reveals where on the 
line between the two poles a defensible understanding of the relation between 
democracy and justice must lie. Other theorists might reach different conclu-
sions than the ones we envisage. However, we believe that researchers explor-
ing institutional reform regarding democracies’ responsibilities towards the 
future will have to position themselves on the line making up the first dimen-
 
24 Meyer, Sanklecha 2014. 
25 Arneson 2004; Wall 2007. 
26 Buchanan 2002; Valentini 2012. 
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sion of our framework. Similarly, comparative research will reveal where on the 
line between the two poles citizens of different democratic states place these 
duties of intergenerational justice. The line between the two poles of the rela-
tion between intergenerational justice and democracy, however, only defines 
one dimension of our framework. We now turn to the second dimension. 
 Democratic Responsibility for the Future 
The ascription of responsibilities for the just distribution of the burdens for 
adequate environmental protection, for climate measures or other goals of sus-
tainable development plays a central role in international politics. Granted that 
according to our premise above, this leads to the question of whether and how 
democracies can be considered as responsible collective agents. This question 
brings us to the second part of our endeavor. We are looking for a conceptual 
vector space that frames in what respect democracies can be considered bearers 
of responsibility for fulfilling duties towards future generations.  
According to many exponents of climate ethics, the classic understanding 
of individual responsibility is no longer compatible with the global and, in par-
ticular, intergenerational scope of climate change.27 If one assumes a similar 
scope for the basic sustainability challenges, then this concern is also valid for 
those, and mainly for two reasons. First, even though establishing causal re-
sponsibility for damage to the environment or to the climate is a sufficient rea-
son for attributing liability to the agent having caused the damage, this by itself 
does not necessarily establish that the agent accrues moral duties. Particular 
problems arise on an aggregated level.28 Second, besides the fact of having 
caused the harm being central for ascribing responsibility, contributions to 
maintaining and promoting social practices that increase the risk of damage to 
the environment and climate can become relevant for assessing responsibility 
for expected harm in the future. However, for norms regarding the moral as-
sessment of aggregated effects of behavior to be effective they need to be widely 
shared and accepted among the members of a society and many members of the 
society need to support changing the relevant social practices.  
This is why regarding intergenerational demands of justice in light of envi-
ronmental challenges and climate change, considerations of collective respon-
 
27 Attfield 2009; Gardiner 2004, 2006; Jamieson 1992, 2010. 
28 Burger, Christen 2011; Christen, Schmidt 2012. 
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sibility play a central role.29 For instance, even though something such as the 
cumulative greenhouse gas emissions of all individuals leads to damaging con-
sequences, it is not possible to determine which individual emitted the green-
house gases that will lead to a specific damage in the distant future.30 In con-
trast, it is much more likely for the collective of the state to be ascribed such 
responsibility for the future. It is the collective and its legal regulation that al-
lows for environmentally damaging behavior. Similarly, one can also claim that 
democracy’s responsibility for the future does not extend to single individuals, 
but rather to the collective of future citizens.31 How to conceptually understand 
democracies as collective agents, however, is a rather underexplored issue in 
normative political theory. 
In business ethics by contrast, the question of how companies and corpora-
tions can be considered as collective agents capable of responsibility has been 
intensively discussed.32 Assuming that states rule similarly to companies, ideas 
about corporate responsibility are often transferred to states. The following two 
perspectives on the concept of collective and corporate responsibility are most 
common in the debate about the responsibility of states: i) The first perspective 
assumes that states can be considered responsible collective agents only if their 
institutions adequately involve their citizens in political decision-making.33 ii) 
Conversely, the second perspective assumes that states are agents capable of 
responsibility not because they have a specific institutional structure, but rather 
because their political conduct brings about inward and outward consequences, 
for which states are to be held responsible.34 According to the first perspective of 
collective responsibility, collective agents are to be considered as non-natural 
persons that can develop intentions, generate knowledge and make as well as 
implement decisions through their decision-making procedures. Therefore, they 
can take on responsibility like natural persons. According to the second per-
spective, collective agents are only persons in a derived sense because their 
status as agents is ascribed to them either externally or through their mem-
bers.35 
 
29 Nolt 2011; Sinnott-Armstrong 2005; Vanderheiden 2007, 2011. 
30 Braham, Van Hees 2012; Kutz 2000; Lawson 2013; Nefsky 2011. 
31 Meyer 2005; Thompson 2009. 
32 E.g. French 1979, 1984; Neuhäuser 2011; Smith 2013; Werhane 1985. 
33 Erskine 2001; Pasternak 2013; Stilz 2011. 
34 Jubb 2014; Miller 2004. 
35 This contrasting of two perspectives of collective responsibility is certainly simplified and 
schematic. In particular, conceptions of states as collective agents based on social contract 
theory justifications or on authorization arguments would be worthy of mention. As we see it, 
 Democracy for the Future: A Conceptual Framework to Assess Institutional Reform*   
  
However, there are at least two significant differences between companies 
and states that must be taken into account.36 First, employees can normally 
freely leave and join a company. Conversely, citizens are usually involuntary 
members of a state and can only leave or join a state at high costs, if at all. Sec-
ond, for most companies, it is clear what objectives they strive for beyond profit. 
They produce a certain product or offer certain services. In contrast, democratic 
states should be rather neutral in terms of objectives, beyond securing social 
stability and minimum welfare, and should allow for a wide-ranging plurality of 
ideas of the good life. Due to these two differences between companies and 
states, it is of central importance to clarify under which conditions citizens of 
democracies share the responsibilities of their states. 
Depending on which of the two perspectives of collective responsibility in-
forms the understanding of states as responsible agents, other conditions for 
the joint responsibility of citizens of democracies can be considered valid. i) In 
the case of the first perspective, citizens are jointly responsible for the actions of 
their state only if they have an equal say in policy-making. ii) In the case of the 
second perspective, it is instead relevant that the global community of states 
recognizes a sovereign state as a responsible agent and that its citizens endorse 
it as such. Accordingly, the guarantee of equal participation in democratic deci-
sion-making is only a central condition in the first perspective. In the case of the 
second perspective, joint responsibility is legitimate if citizens identify suffi-
ciently with their state, which is recognized as a responsible agent by the global 
community of states.37 
i) Therefore, according to the first perspective of collective responsibility, 
democracies are collective agents because they can be treated like persons due 
to the ways in which they involve citizens in decision-making structures. This 
leads to the question of the extent to which the institutional decision-making 
structure of a democracy can generate knowledge, as well as make and imple-
ment decisions that are sufficient for democracies taking appropriate responsi-
bility for the future. The examples of defense policies or investments in nuclear 
 
however, these views, each in its own way, represent a combination of the two above men-
tioned perspectives of collective responsibility. For further illumination in this context see e.g. 
Parrish 2009; Stilz 2011. 
36 Pasternak 2013; Wall 2001. 
37 This contrast of the involvement of citizens from individual states for the possibility of 
collective state responsibility is also very simplified in light of the extremely diversified debate 
about the rights and obligations of citizens (e.g. Klosko 2004). For the purposes of our frame-
work, however, we believe that the conditions for involving citizens directly resulting from the 
two named perspectives of collective responsibility are the two key distinctions. 
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power demonstrate that this can be the case.38 However, empirical studies show 
that, especially concerning environmental and climate damage, democracies do 
not perform significantly better than non-democracies in the sustainability of 
their policy decisions.39 
Furthermore, there are a number of skeptical arguments in the literature re-
garding the ability of democracies to be sufficiently concerned with the future, 
such as:40 a) Since human beings tend to favor short-term advantages over long-
term ones, it is probable that democracies tend to prefer policy decisions yield-
ing timely, directly verifiable results. b) In democracies, policy decisions should 
reflect the (potentially short-term) judgments of their currently living citizens 
regarding how policies affect their interests. c) Appropriate decisions regarding 
the future, especially when concerned with environmental destruction or cli-
mate change, presuppose complex scientific knowledge, which only few citi-
zens can acquire in a sufficient manner. d) Democracies tend to neglect the 
interests of future generations because they are usually not represented in the 
decision-making procedures. 
ii) However, these arguments are only valid given a specific expected con-
duct of citizens. As soon as citizens, as well as political agents, identify with 
long-term goals in support of future generations and develop and use the ap-
propriate knowledge, the skeptical objections lose their validity. Regardless of 
the institutional structure of democratic decision-making, democracies seem to 
be able to take on adequate responsibility for the future when their citizens 
demand the appropriate political action.41 Hence, if democracies can be consid-
ered responsible collective agents according to the second perspective of collec-
tive responsibility, then it is possible to explain why democracies, in spite of 
institutional deficiencies, can take on appropriate responsibility for the future. 
Which perspective of collective responsibility is more suitable for under-
standing democracies as collective agents responsible towards the future? From 
the view point of democratic theory, the first perspective of collective responsi-
bility is preferred because it allows for the joint responsibility of citizens to de-
pend on whether citizens had fair opportunities to influence policy decisions. 
However, taking environmental challenges and climate change into considera-
tion, the second perspective seems to be more reasonable, insofar as states 
should be deemed responsible for whatever damage they cause irrespective of 
 
38 Birnbacher 1995. 
39 Burnell 2012. 
40 MacKenzie im Erscheinen; Thompson 2010. 
41 Wallimann-Helmer 2013. 
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how well their citizens have been involved in policy-making. As there are good 
arguments for both perspectives of collective responsibility, we again suggest 
taking them as the two poles of the axis that frames the institutional conditions 
for attributing collective responsibility to democracies rather than as alterna-
tives. 
How the two perspectives of collective responsibility can be reconciled is a 
question for normative, conceptual and empirical research. Comparative re-
search might reveal that in different states with given governance structures the 
two perspectives on collective state responsibility play a different role. Different 
research results will define different points on the line between the two perspec-
tives, determining what role they could play in the understanding of democra-
cies as responsible collective agents. Our contribution, however, is that any 
understanding of democracies as responsible collective agents must take a 
stance regarding both perspectives of collective responsibility.  
 Assessing Institutions and Institutional 
Reforms in Democracies 
Given the considerations on the two conceptual dimensions of our framework, 
we are now in a position to illustrate how our framework works. It allows as-
sessing which institutional reforms are indicated and justifiable in order to 
minimize the risk that democracies do not live up to their responsibilities to-
wards the future.42 The focus is on assessing the conceptual and normative 
weaknesses and virtues of traditional democratic institutions with regard to 
their responsibility towards the future. How well the traditional democratic 
institutions in fact perform regarding their responsibilities towards the future, 
and to what extent the reforms suggested can foster living up to these responsi-
bilities are matters for empirical research. However, in our understanding, we 
look upon our framework as a conceptual basis for guiding meaningful empiri-
cal research of this sort. Both dimensions define the scale against which to as-
sess democracies’ performance and from which to indicate promising institu-
tional reforms. 
Accordingly, suggestions for reforms in the traditional legislative, executive 
and judicial institutions must be evaluated along the two conceptual dimen-
 
42 We remind the reader that we abstract from any considerations on efficacy and efficiency. 
Our concern is primarily normative. 
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sions whose extreme manifestations make up either one of the two poles of the 
relation between democracy and justice or one of the two perspectives of collec-
tive responsibility. The following diagram visualizes the framework and sug-
gests different ideal types of institutional reform depending on where on the 
two axes the answers to the two basic questions are placed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Ideal types of institutional reforms. Own elaboration. 
The vertical axis of the diagram represents the possible relations between de-
mocracy and justice. The horizontal axis shows the two most common under-
standings of democracies as responsible collective agents. 
Depending on where on the line between intergenerational justice having 
unqualified precedence over democracy, and justice being constitutive for the 
possibility of democracy the relation between democracy and justice lies, it is 
either judicial and executive institutions or legislative institutions which are 
considered as primarily justified in indicating reforms. Similarly, the answer to 
the second basic question – whether institutions are more essential for consid-
ering democracies as responsible collective agents or whether it is the ascription 
of responsibility – will determine the direction of reforms towards either incen-
tive structures or institutional design. We expect that any conceptual, norma-
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tive or comparative investigation on the two conceptual dimensions of our 
framework will identify answers somewhere on the two lines between the strict 
answers. The framework allows also to assess the performance of all three tradi-
tional branches of democratic decision-making and will potentially indicate 
more or less modest reforms in each of them. For illustration, we provide the 
different rationales behind the different kinds of reform potentially indicated 
depending on the normative, conceptual or comparative research findings back-
ing one or several of the four possible answers to the two basic questions we 
identify. 
A) If justice takes unqualified precedence over democracy and if democra-
cies are capable of responsibility as collective agents due to their institutional 
structure, then the main question is whether the traditional institutions of dem-
ocratic decision-making can guarantee that democracies satisfy the demands of 
intergenerational justice. The judicial institutions thereby seem to represent the 
ideal type of reform, because these institutions allow for directing political deci-
sion-making towards sustainable policy without significantly changing the 
institutional structure of democratic decision-making. This is a central condi-
tion regarding the first framework of assessment because otherwise there is the 
danger that democracies lose their status as responsible collective agents.  
Judicial institutions are traditionally dedicated to protecting the fundamen-
tal rights of citizens or the constitution of democracies. Understood this way, it 
makes sense to view judicial institutions as guarantors of the demands of future 
generations because they traditionally secure the fundamental rights of citizens 
regardless of when they live.43 Concerning potential environmental challenges 
or climate damage, however, the difficulty arises that judicial institutions have 
traditionally been seen as a supervisory authority only that checks the con-
sistency of policy decisions made by the legislative or executive authorities with 
existing rights and the constitution.44 Such an examination of policy decisions 
is not sufficient for effective environmental and climate measures in favor of the 
demands of future generations.45 For evaluating the consequences of policy 
decisions regarding demands of intergenerational justice, specific competence 
with respect to science and the humanities is necessary. If the expertise of the 
judicial institution is to be accordingly supplemented, then such suggestions for 
reform are close to the introduction of the institution of ombudsmen, like those 
 
43 Bessette, Murray S. Y. 2011; Grosseries 2008. 
44 Lever 2009; Waldron 2006. 
45 Hayward 2005; Stein 1998; Wallimann-Helmer 2015b. 
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that were established in Israel and Hungary. These ombudsmen assess the sus-
tainability of policy decisions in cooperation with an interdisciplinary team.46 
B) If justice takes unqualified precedence over democracy, but if democra-
cies are capable of taking responsibility for the future due to the ascription of 
such responsibility, then the preservation of the institutional structures of dem-
ocratic decision-making holds less importance. If democracies are to be consid-
ered collective agents based on ascription, then it is first and foremost relevant 
for the preservation of democracies as responsible collective agents that citizens 
or (ideally) all other states maintain the ascription of responsibility. This sug-
gests that the executive institutions are the ideal type for reform in regard to the 
most efficient and effective way to ensure the just claims of future generations. 
That is because executive institutions can implement the necessary policy deci-
sions according to the best scholarly knowledge most efficiently and effectively. 
As long as citizens can sufficiently identify with their executive bodies, then the 
possibility for all citizens to participate in policy decisions as equals becomes 
less important. 
Executive institutions traditionally execute and enforce policy decisions. To 
foster democracy’s responsibilities towards the future through reform of execu-
tive institutions, a similar expansion of expertise as the one suggested regarding 
judicial institutions is necessary. One option consists in creating special execu-
tive arms like the environment and sustainability ministries already in place in 
many democracies. However, concerning such ministries, the question arises 
which role scientific influence should legitimately have on the government.47 A 
second option consists in creating institutional settings for policy integration, 
which imply issues of meta-governance.48 Both options, however, face chal-
lenges regarding their democratic legitimacy since they put in power scientific 
or other experts not being elected by citizens.  
C)/D) If, in contrast to the previous two frameworks for normative assess-
ment, justice is constitutive for the possibility of democracy, then the legislative 
institutions seem to represent the ideal type of institutions for securing the de-
mands of future generations. If justice is constitutive of democracy, then ensur-
ing equal participation of all citizens is the central requirement. 
Traditionally, legislative institutions enact, amend and repeal policy. Sug-
gested reforms with regard to the interests of future generations most often 
concern the legislature and respond to one or more of the skeptical objections 
 
46 E.g. Göpel 2012. 
47 Holden 2002; Shrader-Frechette 2002; Sunstein 2002. 
48 Bornemann 2014. 
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(a-d) mentioned in section 3. Suggestions for reforming legislative institutions 
are concerned with advancing the long-term nature of legislative decisions. 
However, depending on whether democracies can take collective responsibility 
for the future due to their institutional structure or due to the internal or exter-
nal ascription of responsibility, these suggestions must be differentiated in 
accordance with the two perspectives of collective responsibility. Either institu-
tional reforms as such are at the core, or these suggestions focus on changing 
the incentive structures within legislative decision-making procedures.  
C) If democracies are capable of taking on responsibility as collective agents 
based on their institutional structure of decision-making, then the traditional 
decision-making structure of legislative institutions should be preserved at a 
minimum. Accordingly, suggestions for reform for furthering responsibility 
towards the future that can be justified seem to be the ones that leave the legis-
lative structures more or less intact. Therefore, assuming that changing incen-
tive structures demands less radical institutional reform, this framework will 
probably foster reforms that change incentive structures. 
The following two suggestions can be understood as legislative measures for 
changing the incentive structures that do not primarily attempt to reform legisla-
tive institutions but to influence the stance of citizens with regard to the inter-
ests of future generations. Vanhuysse and also van Parijs, for example, pro-
nounce that the time for parents’ proxy votes for their children might have 
come.49 Such a system would call for the power of the electorate to shift from the 
older to the younger citizens and could produce the result that political parties 
orient their programs more towards the interests of families and probably to-
wards the interests of future generations. A similar tendency could result if the 
legislature were obligated to debate and decide on results of regularly conduct-
ed opinion polls or deliberative polls.50 In both examples, institutional changes 
are not the main focus of reform but rather raising the awareness for the con-
cerns of citizens or, given commensurate configurations (e.g. only including 
young citizens, parents or environmental activists in polls) for the claims of 
future generations. 
D) If democracies are collective agents responsible towards the future main-
ly because this responsibility is ascribed to them, then even suggestions for 
reform that radically change the traditional institutions of the legislature could 
be justified. For that after institutional reform citizens or the community of (ide-
 
49 Vanhuysse 2013; Van Parijs 1998. 
50 Fishkin 2013; Fishkin, Luskin 2005. 
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ally) all other states still need to be ready to ascribe responsibility for the future 
to a democratic state.  
Suggestions aimed at institutional changes in the legislature include the rep-
resentation of future generations and the increase of the political influence of 
young citizens. First, institutions for the representation of future generations 
could be implemented.51 Thompson, for example, suggests introducing trustees 
whose role would be to articulate the interests of future generations in the legis-
lative assembly and to question those policy decisions that appear to endanger 
the possibility of democracy in the future.52 Furthermore, the introduction of a 
fourth branch of power for ensuring the interests of future generations has re-
cently been suggested.53 Second, quotas for young citizens in the legislative 
institutions of democracy could be implemented. This would ensure that those 
who will experience the environmental and climate consequences the most will 
also be represented appropriately in political decision-making.54 Similar reason-
ing supports proposals for lowering the voting age.55  
We do not take party for one of these suggested ideal types of reforms. We 
give a generic vector space for looking at such reforms. Against its backdrop, we 
can claim that institutional reform is indicated if given their capacities as re-
sponsible collective agents democracies perform badly or there is a potential 
risk that they cannot not fully live up to their duties of intergenerational justice. 
In addition, institutional reforms are justifiable only if they do not undermine 
the conditions of the framework in question, i.e., that democracies do not lose 
their capacity to take on responsibility towards the future as collective agents. 
What reforms should concretely be suggested, however, goes beyond the scope 
of this paper and needs empirical research including aspects of efficacy and 
efficiency. 
 Conclusion 
In this paper we suggest a conceptual framework to assess in what respect re-
forms of democratic institutions are indicated, and what reforms are justifiable 
in order for democracies to be better able to live up to their responsibilities to-
 
51 Dobson 1997; Eckersley 2004, 2011; Ekeli 2005, 2007. 
52 Thompson 2005, 2010. 
53 Tremmel 2015; Wallimann-Helmer 2015a. 
54 Tremmel u.a. 2015. 
55 Tremmel, Wilhelm 2015. 
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wards the future. Our framework consists of two conceptual dimensions. The 
first dimension concerns the relation between democracy and justice. The sec-
ond dimension concerns the conceptualization of democracies as responsible 
collective agents. Our framework claims that if reforms of democratic institu-
tions shall foster that democracies better live up to their duties towards the 
future, and if democracies are to remain responsible collective agents, they 
must satisfy the following requirements: i) Reforms should increase the ability 
of democracies to live up to their duties of intergenerational justice. ii) Reforms 
should not undermine the ability of democracies to take on responsibility as 
collective agents. Hence, investigation of the two conceptual dimensions of our 
framework not only displays which reforms of democratic decision-making 
processes are indicated. They also provide the theoretical framework to evaluate 
which reforms can normatively be justified. 
Overall, our framework helps grounding the preponderantly scattered and 
insufficiently justified suggestions on how the institutional structures of democ-
racies should be changed so that democracies can better fulfill their duties to-
wards the future. Against that backdrop, we see two lines for further research, a 
conceptual one and an empirical one. Conceptual research will contribute to 
two rather neglected but for the topic in question decisive conceptual questions 
of normative political theory: the question of how to understand the relation 
between democracy and justice; and identifying the conditions for democracies 
to be responsible collective agents. Empirical research will have to scrutinize 
the fertility of the framework by demonstrating that it allows guiding empirical 
research as well as by enriching it with additional criteria such as efficiency and 
efficacy. We expect that assessing democratic institutions on the basis of our 
framework will help to identify a set of reforms as normatively justifiable and, in 
doing so, the assessment will go well beyond the mere description of ideal types 
of reform as introduced above. 
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